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I I. 
Humane dignity 
Margaret Urban Walker 
Dignity is a majestic and powerful idea not only in modern and con-
temporary ethics, but in contemporary political discourse as well. 
References to dignity are common in moral philosophy, being part of 
a relatively tight circle of ideas that includes rational agency, auto-
nomous choice, humanity, respect, rights, recognition, decency, and 
moral worth. The idea did not originate with Kant, but Kant put, it 
seems, a definitive and lasting stamp upon it and the circle of moral 
ideas to which it belongs. This is not to say that dignity is tightly and 
uniformly interdefined with these other notions in one particular way. 
The least varying connection, however, is that dignity is a kind of 
moral worth human beings possess that entitles them to respect. This, 
with variations, is the kind of thing moral philosophers and some 
political theorists say. People who are not moral philosophers, but 
who command the concept of dignity, may say that some treatment 
of a person is "beneath" his or her dignity, that it is indecent or dis-
respectful to treat a person that way; they may even say that some-
one's dignity was lost or destroyed. We also, in common speech, have 
the idea of an "indignity," a treatment beneath or out of keeping with 
what a human being deserves and one a human being should not, as 
we say, "suffer." 
One reason more and more people, in many places in the world, 
do command this concept with some of its standard connections is 
the global spread of human rights discourse. From the adoption of the 
United Nations Universal Declaration_ of Human Rights, with its 
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opening pronouncement that all members of the human family pos-
sess "inherent dignity," and "all human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and right," the discourse of human rights and its allied 
language of dignity is a twenty-first century lingua franca of politics 
in what is called the "world community," circulating the concept of 
dignity world-wide. I do not mean to say that it is only due to the 
European tradition that gave form to the legal and moral regime of 
human rights that human beings have some notion of a particular 
kind of human worth. On the contrary, I suppose instead that there 
is something in the concept of dignity recognizable to people of many 
regions, cultures, and faiths that has enabled this idea to be grasped 
and affirmed as widely as it has been, given the circulation of human 
rights discourse (on the argument about the Western European nature 
of human rights, see Sen 1999; Lauren 2003; and Afshari 2007). In 
our time a body of ostensibly authoritative declarations and conven-
tions invoke the idea of dignity as a fundamental-indeed founda-
tional-premise from which an impressive assortment of human rights 
of several types are claimed to flow. 
I want to re-examine the idea of dignity, starting with what is 
problematic in an understanding of dignity that connects it in a tight 
circle with full or fully mature capacity for moral agency, essentially 
an idealized and exclusive concept of dignity for which Kant's think-
ing, especially in his Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals, is the 
paradigm. I want to discuss some strategies, overlapping and mutually 
compatible but distinct, for reconstructing this concept in a more 
humane and humanly inclusive way. The three "humanizing" strate-
gies I will suggest in conclusion are naturalizing dignity, rendering 
dignity relationally, and differentiating our concept of dignity. These 
strategies are intended to preserve the normative force of the concept 
of dignity as an ideal of human interaction, recognition, and concern; 
they continue to give a central place in our understanding of dignity 
to those who are fully, symmetrically, and reciprocally accountable to 
each other. But they attempt to widen the net which catches the 
humanity of many who may not appear to be the paradigm cases of 
full, symmetrical and reciprocal accountability. 
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To begin, I want to look at the nexus of notions with which 
dignity is intertwined in the Kantian formation, to see what is prob-
lematic about the circle they form, and to consider some alternatives 
to reconstructing the concept in the ways I will explore. I then turn 
to these strategies of reconstruction, to invite a conversation about 
what is promising or worrisome in these ways of rethinking dignity, 
or whether there are other ways, and to invite consideration in think-
ing about why we need a concept of dignity at all, and what moral 
work we need the idea of dignity to do. 
I. Worries about the "Kantian" idea of dignity 
An ideal of dignity deeply rooted in the Kantian tradition is both 
idealized and multiply exclusive: beings with rational wills and hence 
powers of autonomous choice have that distinctive moral value called 
'dignity.' All such beings possess dignity, but only such beings do, and 
dignity refers to the only value there is that is moral value. All and 
only such beings deserve respect, the paradigm moral attitude, for this 
view. The feature that qualifies such beings is their endowment with 
rational will and thus autonomous choice, and that feature is also 
that about them which we must aim to respect, even if it can be 
argued that we must refrain from, for example, physically damaging 
or avoidable painful physical and psychological treatment as a way to 
show respect to the rational will "within." 
This conception of dignity and its implications for moral attitude 
and behavior is multiply exclusive. Those human beings who do not 
possess rational wills and the power of autonomous choice do not 
possess the all-important moral value of dignity. Since there is no 
other kind of value that is moral value, it seems that beings, including 
human beings, who do not possess the entitling capacity not only fail 
to possess dignity and to be entitled to respect, they seem to fail to 
possess any distinct moral value. They may nonetheless possess "rela-
tive" value due to their importance to others who happen to love and 
cherish them, but it seems they are not entitled to the responses or 
attitudes constitutive of truly moral recognition. At the same time, 
the responses of love, delight, cherishing, care, pity, and concern 
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these human beings evoke in others are not seen as forms of truly 
moral recognition. In the case of those who do possess rational will 
and so dignity, on this view, what we must morally respond to in 
them is the feature by virtue of which they possess that moral value, 
their capacity for rational willing, not their ability to suffer pain or 
humiliation or rejection, for example, unless these forms of treatment 
can be shown to at the same time also affront their status and func-
tion as autonomous beings or perhaps to interfere with means neces-
sary to act so as to treat persons as ends. Furthermore, what the dig-
nity of these fully operational moral agents commands on the part of 
others of the same moral status is respect as autonomous beings, but 
only this. Other "feelings," such as compassion, sympathy, empathy, 
pity, admiration, or gratitude, are merely "pathological" on the 
Kantian scheme; feelings that are mere animal inclinations can 
endow their objects with a value relative to human desires, but this 
relative value is not moral value. 
I don't suppose that many contemporary neo-Kantians, or even 
contemporary Kantians, are willing to defend this view in precisely 
this stark form, but I think the original Kantian logic is likely to 
follow the notion of dignity in at least this way: Dignity will be asso-
ciated with moral capacity, moral capacity will be associated with a 
rather high level and sophisticated kind of rational deliberation and 
choice, the possession of the relevant endowments for moral agency 
will confer an entitlement to respectful treatment, and respectful 
treatment will be that which acknowledges and perhaps affirms the 
value of just this sophisticated moral capacity. Explicating Kant in a 
way that endorses his view, Christine Korsgaard says that "the distinc-
tive nature of humanity as such, is simply the capacity to take a 
rational interest in something," and "humanity is the power of rational 
choice, but only when choice is fully rational is humanity fully 
realized" (Korsgaard 1996, 114, 123). Insofar as humanity functions 
positively in our moral valuation, "It is your powers as an agent that 
are to be promoted" (127). Axel Honneth, in his insightful account 
of recognition, identifies as a common premise of modern moral 
thinking (shared, for example, by Hegel and Mead) that "subjects are 
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to be recognized as both autonomous and individualized beings," both 
equal and particular (Honneth 1995, 171, 175). The addition of par-
ticularity is important, and I affirm it later, although the standing in 
question envisions a morally fully-fledged and morally responsible 
agent. In Stephen Darwall's recent book, The Second Person Stand-
point, dignity is "the status of an equal member of the moral com-
munity" to hold others who are such accountable; the second-person 
standpoint defines the moral community, and second-personal address 
presupposes "a common normative standing as free and rational per-
sons" (Darwall 2006, 243, 265) . Darwall also says that "any second-
personal address seeks reciprocal recognition by its very nature" (265), 
apparently equating reciprocal recognition (two-way recognition with 
parties aware of its mutual character), with symmetrical recognition 
(reciprocal recognition as equal), an equation that I will believe must 
be questioned. I mention these views in lieu of a survey to suggest 
that the tight links among dignity, moral agency, moral worth, respect, 
and recognition, and the categorical (all or nothing) logic of these 
concepts, stemming from the Kantian paradigm, are continuing and 
forceful. 
The tight circle of concepts to which dignity has belonged pro-
duces exclusions, and these exclusions follow from not only the orig-
inal Kantian but also prevalent neo-Kantian ideas about dignity as 
the paradigmatic, or the only, moral standing and its links to full 
moral agency. They unavoidably raise questions: What of human 
beings who do not possess full moral capacity (even defined by a 
threshold of ability) or who possess a limited or reduced kind of it? 
What of those forms of pain, suffering, insult or diminishment that 
human beings endure at the hands of others which either do not 
directly assault their moral capacity, or that not only assault or insult 
moral capacity but which punish, hurt, refuse, or repudiate what is 
human in them that is not, or not only, their moral capacity? If 
respect is the paradigm attitude that salutes another's moral value, 
what then of those other attitudes that grasp and address another's 
humanity, Hke compassion, cherishing, pity, and gratitude? And what 
of the uniquely human features of individual expression, attachment, 
168 MARGARET URBAN WALKER 
desire, joy, sadness, and grief that embody the individuality of human 
individuals who possess less or little in the way of those rational 
capacities, or whose capacities are differently configured? 
2. Do we need the concept of dignity, and why? 
Perhaps the concept of dignity is part of a metaphysical mythology we 
do not need, and one that stands in the way of addressing well-being 
and ill treatment and so the comfort and suffering of human beings, 
and perhaps other beings, in a realistic and humane fashion. Such a 
view is at home with some kinds of utilitarian thinking. In one recent 
op-ed piece Singer applies philosophical views for which he is already 
well-known. Writing on the case of Ashley, a 9-year-old child whose 
severe mental disabilities give her the functioning of a 3-month-old, 
Singer responds to critics of her parents' decision to treat her chemi-
cally and surgically to keep her small and light in size and sexually 
nonmature in order to better care for her. Singer criticizes a statement 
by Ashley's parents that this treatment will give her more dignity. 
Singer's response is that dignity is an irrelevant category to apply to 
any individual with human's 3-month-old mental capacity, however 
precious Ashley is to her parents and siblings. Singer says, "what mat-
ters in Ashley's life is that she should not suffer" (Singer 2007) . This 
viewpoint challenges those who consider dignity important in this 
case to explain how dignity can even make sense in this case, and in 
many other cases of several reduced mental capacity. 
Soran Reader has laid down another aggressive challenge, as it 
were from the opposite end, to what she terms the "agential bias" that 
permeates American and European moral philosophy in the self-por-
trait of persons as paradigmatically "active, capable, free, and inde-
pendent" (Reader 2007, 603-604). Reader argues that the other, non-
agential aspects of a person-suffering, weakness, vulnerability, 
constraint, dependency-are elements of human life that should 
receive attention for the profound degree to which they shape our 
lives. More strongly, they are not fallings away or privations or lapses 
in being a person, but are in fact presupposed, according to her, to 
our more highly valued agential features (588) . If that is so, we should 
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"recognize and dignify" the non-agential aspects as just as much 
aspects of "full, complex personhood" (592). Reader lays down a chal-
lenge to incorporate (an appropriately loaded word, with its reference 
to our essentially embodied existence) many more aspects of what is 
human into a picture of humanity and (I assume) its dignity, but also 
to abandon the idea that certain moral capacities, especially forms of 
intellectual capacity and executive control, have a preeminent place, 
even if they still have an important one. 
I hasten to apologize to Singer, and even more so to Reader (who 
does not address the topic of dignity directly), for not engaging these 
important views in depth. I use their views here purely to exemplify 
some striking challenges to the usefulness-the scope and sufficiency-
of the concept of dignity predicated on the' idea of certain higher 
moral and mental capacities. They focus questions sharply about the 
extent to which a picture of human beings as uniquely endowed with 
moral personality, a valuation of human beings to the extent that 
they do possess that endowment, and a definition of that endowment 
largely in terms of normal adult human intellectual and reflective 
capacities and capacities of independent self-control, intellectual or 
not, adequately captures the moral value of humanity or those 
features which determine the moral pull of one human being on 
another. These challenges have the virtue of raising a stark question: 
is it a moral mistake to be drawn into a way of thinking that treats the 
full complement and development of mature moral capacities as an 
endowment of human beings that lays special claims upon us in our 
treatments of and responses to them? 
In response, I take the position that it is not a mistake, and it is 
a necessity to acknowledge that full moral capacity-the capacity to 
engage at a threshold level in relations of reciprocal accountability 
organized by normative expectations that assume the authority of 
moral and other norms-is a distinctive feature of human beings with 
distinct moral significance (see Walker 2006 on the central role of 
accountability and trust in sustaining moral relations). I do not 
disagree with Reader that there is an agential bias in our dominant 
philosophical' conception of human persons, but I do not think the 
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moral weight that attaches to agency is simply a mistake. We 
wouldn't have morality as we know it without this characteristic, 
although not universal, set of human capacities. All those who possess 
some functional threshold level of this capacity are indeed placed 
distinctly with respect to all others who possess it: they are bound to 
participation in fully mutual and symmetrical accountability, the 
calling-to-account of one another without which no norms have 
effective social authority. There is no need to deny that a normal 
and fully reflective mature ability to participate in interpersonal 
accounting is a distinctive human species characteristic that makes 
possible the exquisitely intricate normative structure of shared 
human life of which morality is one part. There is increasing scien-
tific evidence that this capacity is not entirely cognitive, but involves 
emotional ' sensitivities as well, and surely more attention must be 
paid to the embodied character of the expression, recognition, and 
responsiveness of human beings in ways that constitute moral rela-
tions. 
On the one hand, a view such as Reader's is too quick to diminish 
the moral significance of the difference that human agential capaci-
ties make to there being such a dimension of human life as morality. 
On the other hand, it minimizes differences between those vulner-
abilities, dependencies, and passivities that are woven through, or 
that predictably punctuate, uncompromised human agency and those 
that are in fact disabling of agency in some respect. Disability theo-
rists teach us to be very careful how we conceive of features of 
individuals as disabling when forms of disablement really arise from 
the hostility of humanly constructed physical and social environ-
ments to the expression of some people's agency (Wendell 1996; 
Scully 2009). Still, there are disabilities that transcend the limits of 
environmental hospitality and diminish or circumscribe agency. The 
ethics of care and dependency teach us to remember that we all 
always vulnerable and interdependent, and that all of us at some 
times in our lives are among those not fully able (Tronto 1993; Sev-
enhuijsen 1998; Kittay 1999). These facts and our universally shared 
experiences of them, whether they are admitted and emphasized or 
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not, are as integral to humanity as are capacities for self-control, 
reflective choice, reciprocal understandings and interpersonal 
accountability. 
To say that all those who possess some functional threshold level 
of this capacity can distinctively enter into fully symmetrical account-
ability, however, is not to say that only those who can participate in 
fully symmetrical reciprocity with each other are parties to the 
practices of responsibility of which accountability is always a central 
dimension. First, there are many reciprocal relations of accountability 
that are not fully symmetrical. Institutional roles of authority and 
subordination between those equally capable provide one example. 
Relations between children and adults, not equally capable in all or 
many respects, and more generally relations between those lacking 
certain competencies and those who possess them, relations of care 
or guardianship, are others. Many of these relations involve forms of 
non-symmetrical reciprocity: they are relations in which there are 
normatively acceptable ways for the participants to respond to each 
other, but their respective prerogatives and obligations with respect 
to each other are not identical. Many forms of these nonsymmetrical 
but reciprocal relations are morally defensible, and even morally 
required. Yet it is also true that historically the model of morally 
justified asymmetrical relations has repeatedly been used to justify 
arbitrary and socially imposed asymmetries on adults fully capable of 
and entitled to symmetrical standings: men over women; the aristo-
crat over the commoner; higher over lower class or caste; civilized 
over barbarian; free over slave, etc. (Aristotle's ethical and political 
views are the classic philosophical loci of this kind of philosophical 
apology for hierarchy, but the patterns of thinking has persisted down 
the centuries.) Furthermore, all differentials in reciprocal moral 
standing, whether justified or not, are subject to abuse. The different 
or unequal bases of reciprocity may be exaggerated, improperly 
generalized over areas where they need not obtain, or simply exploited 
by the stronger to exercise power over those who are unlikely to be 
able to complain, or whose complaints are unlikely to be credited. 
But the indefensibility of some forms of nonsymmetrical reciprocity 
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does not erase the reality and defensibility of other unavoidable kinds 
of nonsymmetrical, yet reciprocal, relations. 
Further, the competence to participate, wholesale or retail, in rela-
tions of reciprocal accountability does not exhaust what is valuable 
to or among human beings. This competence is not the only thing 
about human beings that we reasonably cherish and seek to protect, 
enjoy, and enhance through practices of responsibility that embody 
moral values. Human beings lacking in forms of competence to par-
ticipate in moral accounting need not be lacking in other valuable 
and valued features of humanity, for only some of these valued human 
features require capacities for reflective choice or responsible agency. 
Other such features cherished by and among human beings are 
humanly distinctive forms of attention, orientation to our surround-
ings, expression, feeling, connection, and relation. Peter Singer is 
impatient with the idea that a child, especially an infant, can be said 
to have dignity. But this is a real question: how might we apply that 
idea to the infant and the child? It is obvious that young children can 
experience shaming and degrading conditions of belittlement, dirti-
ness, poverty, or abuse, but it is also true that even small children 
have cognitive capacities and emotional differentiation that infants 
do not. And yet, despite Singer's impatience, people very commonly 
say they believe severely mentally compromised human beings, 
despite a lack of certain cognitive and emotional functioning, should 
nonetheless be treated, as much as is practically possible, with dignity. 
The challenge is to rebut Singer's presumption that this is a senti-
mental rhetoric. Rebutting this presumption, though, might involve 
precisely, among other things, attending to the role of certain senti-
ments that are understood when expressed, perceived, or responded 
to as signature attributes of the human kind, and hence ones that 
figure in what we are able to think of as an adequately dignified or 
undignified situation or treatment for a human being. 
Dignity need not be the only morally weighty consideration per-
taining to the treatment of human beings. One might worry about 
trying to pack too much into the idea of dignity, or making too much 
of our moral sensibility rest upon considerations of dignity. This itself 
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might be a symptom of domination by a Kantian (or more broadly, 
an agential) perspective in which dignity monopolizes the moral field. 
After all, on the face of it, suffering and well-being have their own 
moral weight as considerations about how to treat human beings as 
well as other non-human creatures. On the other hand, over a wide 
range of cases, one does not grasp what human beings can suffer or 
what it means for them to fare well without understanding particular 
forms of suffering that arise from human sensibilities and particular 
forms of enjoyment that are imbued with humanly distinctive desires 
and responses, again not confined to rational agency. Importantly, it 
is unmistakably human as well to experience particular forms of suf-
fering and delight at the distinctively human experiences of other 
human beings, including others' experience of our own reactions to 
them. It is unmistakably human to experience indignation and pity 
at the treatment of others, and also to react emotionally to the reac-
tions or failures to react of those among us who witness pitiable, 
degrading, or unconscionable treatment of others, whether or not 
those so badly treated are capable of sharing or appreciating these 
reactions. It does not seem forced to think of human dignity as impli-
cated in these reactions to human beings (nor does it require us, for 
example, to deny that there might be analogous reactions to the 
treatment of other feeling beings) . As was stressed by theorists such 
as David Hume and Adam Smith in the sentimentalist moral tradi-
tion (Kant's contemporary counterpoint), morality has greatly to do 
with capacities for "fellow feeling" of both positive and negative sorts, 
and with feelings about the feelings that we show and that are shown 
by others. Perhaps dignity has more to do with the recognition and 
the operations of this aspect of our common humanity than has yet 
been fully explored. 
How might we begin to rethink the idea of dignity to capture some 
of this complexity? We need, I believe, to preserve the truth that 
human beings as a species-type possess special features in virtue of 
which they are capable of constituting moral relations, and that all 
human beings capable of reciprocal and symmetrical accountability 
do stand in a special relation to each other as bearers of full and 
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symmetrical mutual accountability. Yet other human beings are 
encompassed in relations of reciprocity that are not entirely or fully 
symmetrical, and some are held among us in a kind of trust in and 
for humanity even if they are capable of little or very partial reciproc-
ity. Finally, there is much that is distinctively (whether or not 
uniquely) human that we have reason to value among ourselves (and 
not only for the reason that it distinguishes us as human). The ques-
tion remains: how is the tight circle of notions connected to dignity 
opened to constitute an arc of recognition, reciprocity, responsibility, 
and response that fully comprehends (in both senses of that term-to 
include and to understand) humanity? 
3. Humanizing dignity 
I begin from the idea that dignity is a standing, that is, a socially and 
interpersonally effective position comprising values, prerogatives, 
entitlements, liabilities or responsibilities that others are bound to 
recognize and in response to which others and the one who possesses 
dignity act and interact. We might think of dignity as realized in the 
shared understanding and coordinated expression of this standing by 
ones who possess it and others with respect to them. If dignity is a 
standing in this way, and so is an essentially interpersonal construc-
tion, then dignity is underpinned and required, but not fully deter-
mined, by independent features of the one who possesses it. To pos-
sess dignity is to be able to express and exercise this standing, at least 
to some extent and in some ways, and the expression and exercise 
require that others not block or thwart this expression and exercise, 
but also to have others give at least implicit recognition and in some 
degree appropriate supporting responses to its expression and exer-
cise. Dignity then is constituted in a successful enactment of at least 
some of its characteristic exercises both by one who possesses dignity 
and those who must recognize it. The possessor of dignity must exer-
cise capacities and engage in expressions that exemplify and claim 
dignity, and those who must give it recognition must also exercise 
their capacities to provide confirming and supporting responses. If 
there are multiple capacities and expressions from either side that 
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exhibit and affirm humanity, then those characteristic exercises and 
responses that constitute dignity will be multiple. It will not be only 
the display and recognition of some rational capacities that will claim 
or affirm the dignity of human beings. 
The way I have just described it makes dignity an interpersonally 
effective standing that is multiply conditioned or relative. It is inter-
personal, and so requires uptake to be successfully expressed. Its 
enactment is also relative to certain capacities relevant to its exercise; 
if there is not only one human capacity that grounds dignity, then it 
can be expressed and can seek recognition through some capacities 
rather than others, either at a particular time or over time. Finally, 
its successful enactment requires a certain threshold that is recogniz-
ably human, whether or not it is paradigmatic for the fullest develop-
ment of a particular kind of human functioning; since uptake is a 
crucial part of successful expression, others must be able to respond 
in particular ways that affirm and complement its recognizable 
humanness. I hasten to acknowledge that this is all abstract in the 
extreme. I quickly turn to three directions in which we might seek 
concretely to rethink dignity as an interpersonally effective standing: 
naturalizing it; rendering it explicitly relational; and differentiating it in 
terms of multiple morally affirming (and rejecting) responses. 
Naturalizing dignity 
To decisively break from the abiding Kantian tendency to tie dignity 
solely to some form of rational capacity requires thinking about what 
in humans as we actually find them we as humans recognize as deeply 
human, and so what it is we have reason to value in valuing human 
beings. I have not found very deep or extensive articulations of the 
idea of humanity and its dignity other than Kant's guiding one, but 
this is what we need. The UN Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights is one contemporary reference point. But being a political 
document and not a piece of moral philosophy, the Declaration vaults 
from the initial assertion of the inherent dignity of human beings to 
a sweeping manifesto of twenty-seven substantive rights. A contem-
porary proponent of human rights, the philosopher James Nickel, 
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argues against theoretical compactness and in favor of a "many-leg-
ged" defense of human rights that interprets dignity as requiring all 
those "ways to recognize and respond to the value or worth that is 
found in life as a person," including "any particular feature of persons 
that has distinctive value" (N ickel 2005, 394). Nickel focuses on four 
sorts of moral claims secured by dignity: to have a life; to lead one's 
life; and to be free of severely cruel and degrading, as well as severely 
unjust, treatment. This goes in the right direction, although it does 
not give much guidance to those aspects of our humanity that com-
fort, move, and connect us but that are not so directly implicated in 
"leading" a life of one's own. Here the connection of dignity with full 
human agency remains strong. 
Human capabilities theorists Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum 
introduce a more richly pluralistic picture of potentials for the full 
roster of characteristic human functionings. In Nussbaum's version, 
the one that most clearly articulates a particular vision of capabilities, 
the capabilities list has ten items ranging from life, bodily health, and 
integrity, through cognitive and emotional powers, to communion 
with nature, freedom to play, and a certain control over one's environ-
ment. This "thick" picture of human good is still very much oriented 
to agency through functionings, although it is decidedly more gener-
ous with respect to the range of functionings included. But "the list" 
remains a list, rather than an exploration of the diverse expressions 
and experiences of ourselves and others as human. Nussbaum simply 
annexes to this list bits of neo-Kantian machinery: that certain capa-
bilities exert a "claim" that they should be realized and that each 
person exerts a claim as "an end" to the realization of her or his capa-
bilities (Nussbaum 2000, 70-86, especially 74, 83). A more worrisome 
feature of this otherwise welcome pluralism about what is characteris-
tically human is the disconcerting tendency of Nussbaum to refer to 
the absence of capabilities as the "absence of a human life," to describe 
one who lacks the capabilities for some functionings as "not really a 
human being" (73), or to characterize acts in the absence of certain 
capabilities as a "merely animal" way of life. But human beings are a 
complexly endowed kind of animal, and the idea of human dignity 
HUMANE DIGNITY 177 
needs to capture and protect our humanity without erasing our ani-
mality. Nussbaum's more recent statements of her capabilities approach, 
in the 2006 book Frontiers of Justice, approach the relation between 
dignity and capabilities more carefully. Nussbaum now says that the 
capabilities themselves articulate the dignity of which a human being 
is worthy, and that a human life is inescapably that of an animal body 
with a developmental trajectory and persistent vulnerability. Even in 
the more recent work, however, Nussbaum persists in describing some 
severely incapacitated human lives as "not fully human" or "not a 
human life at all" conflating the normative role of the capabilities in 
prescribing acceptable treatment of human beings with a use of the 
capabilities list as a criterion to qualify or disqualify the humanity of 
some humans (Nussbaum 2006). 
I am suggesting that we need space for an account that fully natu-
ralizes the idea of the dignity of human beings, finding dignity not 
only in the rational agency of those human individuals who can be 
fully accountable (or in enough ways independently capable of func-
tioning) but within a larger field of relations and responses. The rela-
tions and responses that are important are those that join us in what 
human beings recognize as particularly human modes of connection, 
what Eva Kittay describes as "a matrix of relationships embedded in 
social practices" in and through which we learn responses, responsi-
bilities, and feelings that embody appropriate acknowledgments 
(Kittay 2005, 111). Dignity must refer to a standing in which human 
beings are free from, and actively shielded from, a variety of treat-
ments, environments, and human relations incompatible with what 
dignity protects. Treatments incompatible with dignity include those 
that deny the presence of humanity in a human individual, such as 
relegating some human "kinds" to inferior grades of humanity or sub-
human status, as has been so commonly done in human societies 
based on gender or racial or ethic categories (Walker 2003). They 
include ones that denigrate human beings for displaying attributes 
that are in fact inescapably human as if they are something "lower" 
than human (being vulnerable physically and psychologically or 
displaying need, fear, or pain) and ones that exploit a human attribute 
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so as to denigrate a human individual (in the extreme case forms of 
torture, and more commonly exploitation through the needs of 
human beings). One case of exploiting a human attribute to deni-
grate a human being which we cannot take lightly, given its long 
history and social impact, is the common philosophical habit of 
declaring some particular characteristic human property as definitive 
or constitutive of humanity. By consequence of such stipulations, the 
humanity of a human individual who lacks that property or its fullest 
development may be denied, or the individual lacking the property 
may be declared not fully human, or of a lower grade of humanity, or 
(commonly) is simply ignored for the purposes of theoretical discus-
sion (see Reader 2007; Kittay 2009). But dignity must also refer to 
the affirmation and positive and enabling support for the varieties of 
what is human, as well as openness to the enjoyment by and among 
human beings of what is human. 
Capacities for rational choice, autonomous action, and moral 
responsibility are distinctive human attributes, and treating human 
beings who possess these valuable human attributes as if they did not, 
exploiting those attributes to denigrate human individuals, or aiming 
at the destruction and thwarting of those attributes does deny or 
assault human dignity. But the human characteristics that call upon 
the responsibility of accountable others are not exhausted by the 
rational capacity for accountability. Responsibility is called upon by 
human capacities for and vulnerabilities to many kinds of pain, suffer-
ing, insult, terror and neglect, as well as responsiveness of human 
beings to experiences of comfort, pleasure, physical integrity, skill, and 
control; by human capacities to respond to and to evoke and sustain 
shared or pleasurable or caring responses in others through touch, 
voice, feeling, shared attention, laughter or weeping; by the capacity 
to give and respond specifically to care, kindness, recognition, and 
fellow feeling (Kittay 2005, 122). Other characteristics that call out 
the responsibility of accountable agents are the humanly familiar kinds 
of expressiveness, absorption, and possessiveness that reveal human 
attachment, imagination, and memory, often in strikingly individual 
form. Human expressiveness includes but is not limited to capacities 
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for more or less intentional self-representation. Much of what we love, 
enjoy, and are moved by in others, and what we long to feel is loved 
and cherished in ourselves and capable of moving others, are familiar 
and sometimes individuating features-physical, emotional, expressive-
that have little to do with our rational capacities as agents but every-
thing to do with our human purchase on others and our irreplaceabil-
ity as human beings. (See also Vanlaere and Gastmans 2007). 
Relational dignity 
Second, we need a fully relational way of conceiving and using the idea 
of dignity. Eva Kittay says that it is a mistake to sort individuals for 
moral consideration by intrinsic properties rather than by the rela-
tional property of being a member of the human family (Kittay 2005, 
124). Annelies van Heijst argues that while the idea of intrinsic dig-
nity should be retained, we need nonetheless to think of dignity as 
"secured, or even produced, in an interactive process of attentive care-
giving" (van Heijst 2006a, 91). She quotes Paul Valadier saying that 
dignity in this sense "is a relationship, or rather, it manifests itself in 
the gesture by which we relate to others to consider them human, just 
as human as we are ... " (94). I have already suggested that there are 
multiple characteristic features of human beings that are exercised and 
that are acknowledged in the kind of expression and recognition that 
constitutes dignity as an interpersonally effective standing. I want to 
say it is our humanity, in its varied expressions and enactments, that 
constitutes our claim to dignity, but that dignity is a claim that mayor 
may not be honored. It is the affirmative response to the valid claim 
that constitutes the standing that is dignity. This is why it is compre-
hensible to speak of individuals' dignity being denied. 
Differentiating responses to dignity 
Finally, when I speak of the need for a differentiated conception of 
dignity I refer not only to the varieties of human characteristics, 
expressions, and functions that we share and can acknowledge or 
affirm in other human beings, but to the varieties of response through 
which we can affirm or deny, celebrate or denigrate, support or thwart 
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the humanity of these and their bearers. Dignity has been tightly 
linked to a particular kind of morally significant response: the attitude 
of respect that recognizes the moral personality and agency of others. 
It is not news that the attitude of respect, while it can be given a more 
extensive meaning, is heavily weighted toward non-interference in 
the exercise of rational self-control in those capable of it. The asso-
ciation between autonomy, negative liberty, noninterference, and 
dignity runs deep and runs in several directions through moral and 
political thought in the European and especially in the American tra-
dition. But the idea that respect is the only or the primary attitude 
that constitutes the uptake of dignity is as exclusive as is the idea of 
dignity premised on rational agency to which it corresponds. 
Assaults on dignity can take the forms of indifference, neglect, 
exclusion, ridicule, rejection, devaluation, and implicit as well as 
aggressive contempt. These are failures of human beings to meet oth-
ers' humanity with forms of affirmation, confirming expression, com-
munion, attention, and enjoyment. Annelies van Heijst comments 
at one point on disturbing reports from Dutch nursing homes, saying 
simply: "Practically no one spends some time with them, sits with 
them, talks to them or caresses them" (van Heijst 2006a, 90) . It is 
remarkable how hard it remains theoretically to make the idea of 
human dignity responsive to such simple but urgent ways humanity 
can be denied, insulted, ignored and erased. There are nuanced phys-
ical and emotional responses that confirm a human presence-a greet-
ing, a smile, a gaze, a touch. To meet with none of them or too few 
can be a profound offense to dignity. And it is a common feature of 
the intentional denial or instrumentalization of others' humanity-
whether in concentration camps and prisons, or in nursing homes or 
other institutional environments-that efforts are made to render 
some distinctly human or especially humanly individuating aspects of 
a human presence obscure or deniable. 
4. Conclusion: A twenty-first century agenda 
We might hope that fundamental moral theory in the twenty-first 
century will move beyond pervasive fictions of equal rational actors in 
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symmetrical relations and will tax itself with the problems of asym-
metry in so many human relations. Asymmetrical relations of power 
and dependency require us to explain and defend the central moral 
value of keeping human beings in humanly dignifying relations to 
each other. One problem of asymmetry arises in the universal human 
situation of various forms of dependency, interdependency, and vul-
nerability; a second is the persistent fact of social subordination, ine-
quality, or exclusion of, or spasms of persecution and violence toward, 
some groups of human beings by others. These problems place differ-
ent demands, but I have suggested that at their root lies a strenuous 
task: to rethink the moral ideal of dignity that grounds demands for 
full recognition of the full humanity of every human individual and 
for truly humane responses to the humanity of others. 
